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In the following pages I shall endeavor to treat,
with the brevity which must necessarily characterize a
limited dissertation,on the uses of an equitable remedy,
whose range of utility is exceeded perhaps by but one
other. I have not attempted to treat of the equity
practice and pleading involved in a scholarly discussion
of the subject, more thorough and learned than this can
possibly be, but I have confined myself to the three ap-
plications of this equitable remedy which I consider most
important.
I shall touch briefly upon the history of the in-
junction writ and after considering the several neces-
sary definitions, I shall pass to the requisites for ob-
taining, the writ, and then follows the topic to which
this treatise is mainly devoted.
That the injunction was borrowed from the Romans
cannot be doubted ; it partakes of the nature of a cer-
tain application of the interdicts according to the civ-
il law. The term interdict was used in the Roman Law
in three distinct but cognate senses : its use in one
of these,- ie, where it was used to signify the Prea-
2tor's order or decree, applying the remedy in the given
case before him, when it was called decretal, bears a
close resemblance to the injunction of our courts of
Equity. It is said to have been called interdict be-
cause it was originally interposed in the nature of an
interlocutory decree between the two parties contending
for possession, until the property could be tried. Af-
terwards the appellation was extended to final decretal
orders of the same nature. In the Institues interdicts
are defined to be 'Formulae by which the preator either
commanded or forbad something to be done". (Book LV,
Title XV. )
As we understand the injunction it may be said to
be a writ remedial, issuing by order of a court of equi-
ty, and now also by order of a court of law, in cases
where the plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief ;
and its general purpose is to restrain the commission
or continuance of some act of the party enjoined. It
is a writ which operates in personam and is preventive
rather than restorative, although in the broadest sense
it may be used both in the enforcement of rights and in
the prevention of wrongs.
Injunctions are divided into mandatory and preven-
tive ; the first cornhands a defendat to do a certain
thing, while the second commands a defendant to refrain
from doing a particular ac. The aid of the mandatory
injunction is rarely exercised, and we need in this con-
nection but to mention its existence.
Injunctions are known, according to the time over
which they extend, as interlocutory or perpetual. It
is with the first named that we are now to deal.
"Interlocutory or preliminary injunctions are such
as are granted at any time before final hearing, gener-
ally upon the filing of the bill, and continue until the
coming in of the answer, or until a hearing upon the
merits or the further order of rhe court.'
(High on Injunctions. Sec. 3.)
The only purpose of an interlocutory injunction
is to preserve the' subject in controversy in its condit-
ion at the time of granting the writ, and it does not in
any way determine a right ; it is simply a provisional
remedy to prevent the commission of any further wrong.
The court interposes only such restraint as will preserve
matters in statu q during the litigation, and, by grant
ing the relief sought, the court does not render any de-
cision upon the merits of the case, because this proper-
ly belongs to the final hearing.
Mr. High in his valuable work upon this subject di-
vides the interlocutory injunction into common and spe-
cial, basing the distinction upon whether the writ is-
sues of course or not, but I do not make this distinct-
ion here, because it can be treated more concisely under
a different classification.
Having premised thus far of the origin and nature
of the writ, I will next proceed to a consideration of --
The Requisites for Obtaining.
The remedy of the injunction is a very severe one
and courts of equity will not grant it unless the party
applying for the writ presents a clear case, sufficient
to show that, in equity and good conscience, the court
should restrain the party sought to be enjoined. As
some one kas truthfully said, 'There is no power, the
exercise of which is more delicate, which requires great-
er caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more
dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing an in-
junction. It is the strong arm of equity, that never
ought to be extended, unless to cases of great injury
where courts of law cannot afford an adequate and com-
mensurate remedy in damages. The right must be clear,
5so as to be averted only by the protecting preventative
process of injunction. "
Mr. Pomeroy states one fundamental principle which
he says governs the court and furnishes the answer to
any question, the solution to any difficulties which
may arise. That general principle is as follows : "Wher-
ever a right exists or is created by contract, by the
ownership of the property, or othenvise, cognizable by
law, a violation of that right will be prohibited, un-
less there are other considerations of policy or expe-
resortdiency which forbid a mrst to this prohibitive remedy.'
of the conditions
And this is a concise statenentAwhich must be present
in order to obtain the desired relief by means on an
injuction. Equity will not interfere to restrain the
breach of a contract or the commission of a tort or the
violation of any right where the injured party has a
full, complete, and adequate remedy at law. When legal
compensatory damages will fully remedy the breach of the
complainants rights equity will not interfere. If the
subject matter is an equitable right, interest or estate,
this question doe- not arise, because equity only has
jurisdiction. Thus in Jersey City vs. Gardner, 33 N. J.
Equity, 622, where land had been taken by the city and
6held without paying the owner for the same and an action
was brought to restrain the city from using said lands.
The court held that the remedy of ejectment was adequate.
Judge Knapp in his opinion said, "That courts of equity
do not entertain jurisdiction of causes where there
there exists, at law, a remedy plai1,adequate and com-
plete to redress the wrongs complained of, stands promi-
nent amongs the rules which serve to define the boundary
of jurisdiction between courts of law and courts of
equity.'
There is another class of casesclosely allied to
that just described and growing out of it. Where the
th at
complainant can showAthere could be a remedy at law if
a large number of separate actions were brought, but
that the circumstances are such as to render the main-
tenance of the law actions vexatious and extremely im-
practcable, the court will grant the relief of the injun-
tion, and thus protect the rights of the injured party
in a single equitable proceeding. Wood vs. Monroe,
17 Mich., 230, is an excellent case upon this point and
I deem it worthy of consideration, because the words
of the judge who wr~te the opinion in that case are en-
titled to the greatest weight. In that case a bill
was filed in equity to quiet the title of the complain-
ant to certain lands and, among other grounds, the de-
fendants contested ihe complainants rights to a decree
on the ground that it was not a proper case for relief
in equity, because the complainant claimed by his bill
a complete legal title, which could be fully examined
and settled at law, and that a part of the defendants
had already comenced suits in ejectment. To this,
Judge Cooley said, 'We do not think there is any force
to this objection.' mi m x x x x "The defendants
were severally bringing actions against him in respect
to one of the lots, and as he had an unquestionable
right to file a bill to quiet his title to the others,
and the questions were the same as to all, it was proper
that, to avoid a multiplicity of suits, the ejectment
suits should be enjoined, and the questions in contro-
versy be all determined in one proceeding.' And where
a plaintiff was owner of a private wharf and had erected
and maintained, at great expense, a saw-mill and a ma-
chine for unloading lumber and railroad tiesv the de-
fendants who were owners and proprietors of a steamboat,
without the consent and against the plaintiff's notice
forbidding it, continued to land at the plaintiff's
wharf as oftem as two or three times a day each week,
thereby interfering with the plaintiff's business. The
court in granting an injunction said that the dariAgep,
while they could be repaired in a law court, 'he (the
complainant) would have to sue for every time the de-
fendants landed, and the burden of carrying on such a
multiplicity of lawsuits would make his remedy as grie-
vous as the injury. "  (Turner vs. Stewart, 17 Cent. L.
J., 472.) This part of the subject will be more fully
treated under a different head and I think I have made
it sufficiently plain that the inadequacy of the legal
remedy or its impracticabilty, and a real impending dan-
ger will be all that a complainant is required to show
to a court of equity to entitle him to the remedy of the
injunction. The courts make some distinction between
the requisites for a preliminary and a perpetual injune-
tion. In order to sustain an injunction for the pro-
tection of property pendente lite it is not necessary
that the injured party should present such a case as will
entitle him to a decree upon the final hearing.
Having briefly touched upon what circumstances are
necessary for obtaining the writ, I will now pass to the
a discussion of the important uses to which it has been
applied. First, as used to restrain proceedings at
law, secondly, to restrain the commission of torts,
third, to restrain the violation of contracts.
The Use of the Interlocutory Injunction to
Restrain Proceedings at Law.
The use of the injunction to stay actions at law
was one of the first uses of the remedy and was almost
coeval with the beginning of the Chancery jurisdiction.
When the courts of equity began to exercise this power
it met with the most strenuous opposition of the cornon
law judges, and this opposition continued down to the
time of James I ; but it was then firmly established and
the
has never since been questioned. The objection of Acom
mon law courts was, that it interfered with their de-
cisons and thereby curtailed their jurisdiction. But
this reason is considered as frivolous by most writers,
because it is held to be urged in direct contradiction
to the nature of the writ itself, which operates in per-
sonam and does not interfere with the proceedings.
There is certainly weight to the objection. For
it seems that if a person had a right, or it was adjudged
that he had a right, by a court of law, and he was pre-
vented from exercising that right at law, by means of an
injunction, it would be a direct interference with the
action of a court of law which would have resulted had
no restraining writ issued. And this was the opinion
of Judge Reed in Merril vs. Lake, 16 Ohio, 405, when
he said, "But it is said that this court does not, by
its injunction, act upon the court, but the parties ;
but this, in effect is the same thing. If this court
can enjoin the suitors in the court of common pleas, and
compel them to litigate a matter pending in the court
of common pleas in this court, it is the same thing in
effect as restraining the court." Be that as it may,
we know that to-day, where unaffected by statutes, one
of the most frequent and beneficial uses of this preven-
tive remedy is to stay either the action at law itself
or afterwards to interpose a barrier to the execution
of the law court's decree. Whether the injunction is
to be issued before or after judgment it matters not,
and in this brief treatise we shall make no distinction.
Mr. Pomeroy divides the cases where the aid of the
injunction to restrain proceedings at law may be invoked,
into three classes, and for the want of a better one I
adopt the same classification.
First,- 'Where the controversy, in addition to its
11
legal aspect, involves some equitable estate, right, or
interest which is exclusively cognizable by a court of
equity, so that a complete determination of the issues
cannot be made by a court of law." In a controvery
like that described above, equity not only may, but must
interfere by restraining the action at law, and when it
has done this it must assume jurisdiction of the whole
matter, restrain the suit at law, and carry it to the
final decision. The court of equity is set in motion
by a suit instituted at the pleasure of the party whose
equitable estate, right or interest is threatened. This
rule assumes that the equitable questions involved in
the defense extend to the entire cause so that their de-
cison determines the controversy. And, when the cause
contains both legal and equitable questions which are
distinct, the court of equity while taking jurisdiction
may not restrain the proccedings at law before the ob-
taining of judgment. In Mitchell vs. Oakley, 7 Paige,
68, it was held that in cases of concurrent jurisdiction
a party could come into an equity court for relief upon
the final hearing if he thinks proper to do so, 'But
when he asks the interposition of the extraordinary pow-
er of this court by means of a preliminary injunction, to
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deprive his adversary of the right of a common law trial
as to the matter of fact in dispute between them, he
must show by his bill that some injustice would be done
him, or that he would be deprived of some legal or equit-
able right, if his adversary should be permitted to pro-
ceed at law." Upon this division see Hibbard vs. East-
man, 47 N. H., 507.
Second,- The class of cases with which we have
to deal now, are those which belong to another branch
of the exlusive jurisdiction of equity : that is where
the primary rights, interests or estates are legal, but
remedies
the XgM sought and obtained are wholly equitable.
Some writers treat these cases as those over which both
courts of law and of equity have a concurrent jurisdic-
tion to grant their respective and distinctive remedies.
In a case involving actual fraud, where a suit is brought
upon an instrument and the defense is fraud in procuring
its execution, there is an example of this. If the ju-
risdiction is thus said to be concurrent and the only
question between the two courts arises in regard to the
adequacy of their separate remedies, as a general rule,
the court which first acquires jurisdiction is permitted
to retain exclusive control of the matter under issue.
(Merril vs. Lake, IN Ohio, 40b. )
Whether a court of equity will interfere to restrain
the action or judgment at law or not in cases where the
primary rights of both parties are legal, and the courts
of law will grant their remedies and the courts of equi-
ty may also grant their peculiar remedies, depends en-
tirely upon the adequacy or inadequacy of the legal reme-
dy. (Wilkinson vs. Rewey, 59 Wis., 554, Ins. Co., vs.
Bailey, 13 Wal., 616.) And if the remedy at law is
inadequate or if by reason of some inability of a law
court to mete out justice between the parties, through
a mere judgment for the defendant in the action at law,
but some affirmative relief like reformation or cancel-
lation is required, equity will enjoin the action at law
and carry the whole cause to its final determination.
Whenever a court of equity exercises its jurisdic-
tion over a case involving only legal interests and pri-
mary rights, for the purpose of awarding its exclusively
equitable remedies, because the legal remedies will be
inadequate, it will always, if necessary, enjoin an ac-
full
tion at law Which interrupts the XX exercise of i-s
jurisdiction. (Pomeroys Eq. Juris. Vol. 3., 399.)
Third,- It will be noticed that in the class of
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cases mentioned in the two former divisions, the ground
upon which the court of equity would interfere was some
equitable feature or principle that was connected with
the subject matter of the controversy, or in the reme-
dies appertainable thereto, and this equitable element
of the subject matter, or remedy, constituted a defense
either absolute or partially to the legal action, and
over which the court of equity had either an exclusive
or concurrent jurisdiction.
to do
We have nothngAwith an equitable feature or princi-
ple in this class. There is no equitable defense in any
issue, no equitable right or interest of the defendant
which in any way modifies the legal cause of action,
but the issues are wholly legal, and the ground for the
interferehce of equity is something which arises out
of the trial in the law court. And from the nature of
the ease interference can be sought only after the trial
has taken place and judgment rendered.
It is a fundamental principle of the jurisdiction
of the equity court that wherg a legal judgment has been
obtained through mistake, fraud, or accident, or where
a defendant has been prevented by any of the above
causes from setting up a valid legal defense in a trial
15
at law, a court of equity will restrain proceedings upon
the judgment so obtained and which is against equity
and good conscience to enforce. But the party thus
seeking relief must have been guilty of no negligence,
laches, or other fault upon his part or those acting
for bim. Judge Grier in Truly vs. Wanzer, 16 U. S.
Dec., 339, gave the following language his judicial ap-
proval, 'It may be stated as a general principle, with
regard to injunctions after a judgment at law, that any
fact which proves it to be against conscience to execute
such judgment, and of which the party could not have
availed himself in a law court, of of which he might
have availed himself at law but was prevented by fraud
or accident unmixed with any fault or negligence in
himself or agents, will authorize a court of equity to
interfere by injunction to restrain the adverse party
from availing himself of such judgment. "
Among the instances of fraud which entitle a defen-
dant to this remedy are those where the complainant has
made false and fraudulent representations that the suit
will not be prosecuted against him, and relying upon
these representations he does not endeavor to contest
the case in the manner he would have done had there been
16
no fraud by the other party. (Ian vs. Mortell, 28 Ill.,
478.) In this case an agreement was made between the
attorneys of the parties that the case should not be
tried without notice from each other. The case was
tried two years after it was commenced by a new attorney
for the plaintiff, no person being present for the de-
fendants. Judgment was taken by default without any
knowledge of trial or judgment on the part of the defbn-
dants. The court held that this was such a violation
of the agreement, whether by fraud or accident, as to
affect the rights of the parties and warrant the issuing
of an enjoining writ.
Another form of fraud which will entitle a defen-
dant to this relief is where his witnesses have been
bribed, or in any way tampered with, or where his evi-
dence has been destroyed so as to prevent a full presen-
tation of his defenses. See upon this division the
following cases : Pearce vs. Olney, 20 Conn., 544, Car-
rington vs. Halabird, 17 Conn., 530. And upon the in-
junction to restrain proceedings at law generally : Butch
vs. Lash, 4 Iowa, 215, Ferguson vs. Fisk, 28 Conn., 501,
Hibbard vs. Eastman, 47 N. H., 507, an excellent case.
The Use of the Interlocutor:y Injucction to
Restrain the Commission of Torts.
The second important use of the injunction, w}rich
I will now consider, is to restrain the commission of
acts for which an injured party would not have a compe-
tent remedy in a suit at law. Whenever it is so used
it is for the protection of legal rights and interests.
And here as in the other applications of this remedy
adequacy
the aqu or inadequacy of the relief in compensatory
damages determines the jurisdiction of bhe equity court.
(1) Of Waste.
Waste is any unlawful act or omission of duty, which
results in permanent injury to the inheritance. ( Ch.
Black., 743, Tideman, R. P., Sea. 72J At early
common law by the statute of Marlbridge the only punish-
ment for waste committed was single damages, but the
statute of Gloucester gave to the owner of the inheri-
tance treble damages, which could only be recovered
bPIevaction of waste", also, 'an action on the case in
the nature of waste" would lie. (Ch. Black., N. 304.)
But at a time comparatively modern, equity assumed juris-
diction and now its restraining writ is often used to
prevent irremediable injury. It is not in derogation
of the jurisdiction of the courts of law that equity
does so, but rather in the aid of the legal right which
the complainant possesses.
It is a fundamental principle that waste will not
be restrained where there is any question as to the
complainant's title and where the right to the premises
is in doubt, as where a suit in ejectment is pending,
equity will not interfere. (Pillsworth vs. Hopton, 6
Ves. 51, ) And in order to make out such a case as to
warrant the court in issuing the writ the complainant
must show that the injury is destructive of the inheri-
tance, or productive of irreparable damagel and the facts
must be showm to support such an allegation.
If an intention be shown to commit further waste,
although the act is trivial at first, the court will
interfere and preigent such threatened waste. Usually,
one who applies for the injunction, must hold the legal
title although the equitable title has been held suffic-
ient in some cases, as in a sheriff's sake of lands be-
fore the legal title has been vested. Also a mort-
gagee is entitled to an injunction where the mortgagor
is in possession of the mortgaged premises and commits
waste. The mortgagor may exercise acts of owmership
but will be prevented from depreciating the value of the
property so as to render the security insufficient.
And the injunction may be allowed before the mortgage
is due. These proceedings generally arise during the
mor~gagen
foreolosure of a xmx A 'hen the mortgagor is anxious to
strip the land of everything available, (Hiph on Inj.
246.)
One of the most frequent 'cases in which the question
of waste arises is in the cutting of trees by the tenant
or person in possession. To sustain an application
for the writ in this case it must be shown that the com-
plainant has a clear title to the land, and that the
trees are of some peculiar worth, because a court will
not restrain the thinning of trees in a forest in order
to increase their growth, or where they are of no partic-
ular value. The destruction complained of must be of
some injury to the estate and not in accord-
ance with the principles of good husbandry. What would
be good husbandry in a locality will be governed by the
customs of that place. Thus in one section of the
country, the cutting of timber for the purpose of fen-
cing might be habitually done, while in another section,
timber of the same kind may be considered only proper
for furmiture or other fine work.
Another case where the writ is often used, is to
restrain a tenant from selling or taking off the premi-
ses crops, manure or anything that will tend to run down
the land and lessen its productiveness. (Pultney vs.
Shelton, 5 Ves., 147.) The aid of the injunction may
be properly invoked to prevent the tenant from committing
voluntary waste to the premises, either by destroying,
or altering against the terms of the lease. Al-
though the tendency of courts of equity is to be more
liberal in allowing the writ of the injunction to res-
train the commission of waste than formerly, still a
strong case of destruction or irreparable mischief must
me made out to warrant the relief. (High on Inj., 240.)
(2) Of Trespass.
Trespass differs from waste in that the party who
comnits waste is in lawful possession, and has a right
to the legitimate use of the property, while the tres-
passer enters upon the premises without any right what-
ever to its use. The granting of injunctions to re-
strain the commission of trespass undoubtedly grew out
of the jurisdiction to stay cases of waste. At first
21
the Chancery court refused to interfere to restrain the
trespassers. Lord Thurlow, in Flamang's case, was the
first Chancellor who established a contrary rule, and he
was followed by Lord Eldon, in Thomas vs. Oakley, 18 Ves.
183, (1811) which settled the controversy in England.
The American courts were very diffident about adopting
the remedy in cases of trespass. An injunction for this
purpose was refused in Stevens vs. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch.
317, (1814). Chancellor Kent said, I doubt, exceeding-
ly, whether this extension of the ordinary jurisdiction
of the court will be productive of public convenience.
Such cases are generally of local cognizance ; and draw-
ing them into this court 'ill be very expensive, and
otherwise inconvenient.' He also stated that Lord
Thurlow had been misunderstood. Modern authorities are
opposed to the doctrine of Chancellor Kent, and the ten-
dency is to broaden the jurisdiction in restraining tres-
pass generally, and not to confine it to special cases.
Here as in waste the party complaining must have a
clear title and if the title is denied or be in doubt,
especially where a defendant is in possession, the in-
junction will not usually be allowed, until title is es-
tablished in a suit at law. Another principle which is
found underlying all cases, where the injunction is
sought, is whether the remedy at law is ample and com-
plete. If it is equity will not interfere. The in-
jury complained 6f must be clearly established and the
facts constituting such mischief should be set forth.
The aid of the injunction is often invoked to re-
strain the cutting of ornamental trees, or of forest
trees where the estate is much injured thereby. (Wil-
son vs. The City of Mineral Point, 39 Wis., 160.) And
although a clear title is necessary to obtain an injunc-
tion, wheire there has been a long and undisturbed pos-
session of the premises under a title deducible of recor
such possession couple with unmistakable proof of title
will authorize the relief as against a mere trespasser
without color of right. C Falls, etc., vs. Tibbetts,
31 Conn., 165.)
An injunction will be granted where the complain-
ant shows a clear title and a continuous trespass which
results in damages to his estate, irreparable at law, or
when the nature of the trespass is such that it must
nesceasarily lead to oppressive litigation, or a multi-
plicity of suits. (Turner vs. Stewart, 17 Cent. L. J.,
472, High on Inj., Sees. 458 to 484, inclusive.)
(3) Of Nuisance.
It has long been established that courts of equity
have the jurisdiction to restrain the continuance of
nuisances, where the remedy of pecuniary damages, at
law, will not adequately compensate the injured party.
Where the rights of the person seeking the aid of equity
are doubtful, he must first establish his right at law.
(McCord vs. Ikler, 12 Ohio, 387) And if some of the
questions in dispute are yet in litigation in a law
court, equity will not interfere until it can have juris-
diction of the whole matter. ( Eastman vs. Amoskeag, Nk
etc., 47 N. 11., 71.)
The injury complained of must be actual and not
contingent upon eircumstances, which must necessarily
be present, in order to inflict the injury. And where
a person seeks relief in his own right, by injunction to
abate a public nuisance, he must not only show that he
has suffered W distinct from that of the general pub-
lic, but, the injury must be actual, substantial, not
technical nor inconsequential ; thus, the parties owning
adjoining lots in a village, the court refused to en-
join the defendant from building a wall in front of his
own lot, although partly contructed within the surveyed
24
limits of the highway, and obstructed the complainant's
carriage-road from his house to the main street, when he
had another way equally available, and in daily use ;
and, although the obstructed way added somewhat to the
beauty of The premises. The court held the injury to
be a mere fancy. (Sargent vs. George, 56 Vermont, 627.)
A threatened nuisance may also be enjoined, but the
evidence must be clear enough to satisfy the court that
the act complained of will inevitably result in a nui-
sance, and the reason is as forcible, and in some res-
pects more so,where the creation of an unquestionable
nuisance should be restrained as well as an existing one.
The threatened injury must be real, not trifling and
temporary, and the court will proceed with more caution
than in an existing nuisance, especially where public
convenience will be increased by the act complained of.
(Croker vs. Birge, 54 An. Dec., 347, Rosser vs. Randolph,
31 Am. Dec., 712.)
The instances where the injunction has been granted
to abate nutsances are almost numberless and to attempt
to mention all of them here would be futile. Where
there is no adequate remedy at law any act which injures
one 's property rights, by rendering it unhealthy as a
85
place of abode or by reason of noise, disagreeable odors,
or other circumstances making it impossible to enjoy
a person's property, will be sufficient grounds for
granting the injunction. (Robinson vs. Baugh, 31 Mich.,
290, Marson vs. French, 48 Am. Rep., 272.)
The long continued carrying on of a business, or
doing of any act, will prevent a subsequent writ issuing
to stop the enjoyment of the privilege thus established
by long usage. And too, the party complaining of the
no
nuisance must be guilty of Alaches or delay in applying
for the remedy. Upon this subject see Figh on Inj.,
Secs. 485 to 543, inclusive.)
The Use of the InterlocutoryI junction to
Restrain the Violation of Contracts.
While the remedy for §he past breach of a contract
can only be had in a court of law, equity will enforce
a specific covenant or protect the complainant's con-
tract rights. Courts of equity will grant the remedy
of the injuction in all cases where it will compel
specific performance, in fact it may be said to be a
negative specific performanee. And, as in cases of
specific performance, there must be no doubt as to the
contract, and the complainant's rights must be clearly
shown.
If a contract is negative in its stipulations, or
if the affirmative stipulations imply negative stipula-
tions, the relief of the injunction may be sought. The
adequacy of the legal remedy in each particular case
is the test, both in this country and England, as to
whether an injunction will be granted or not. In Eng-
land the courts have been much more liberal in applying
this test than in America, and have more freely used the
injunction to prevent the violation of contracts. While
the tendency of American courts has been to limit rather
than to enlarge the jurisdiction in cases of this kind.
One of the most frequent uses of the restraining
writ is to prevent the violation of restrictive covenants
in deeds, leases and agreements, which limit the use of
property in a specified manner, or which prescribes the
use of land in a particular way, and by so doing creates
an equitable right which attaches to the land. It mat-
ters not whether the breach of covenant arises between
the original parties to the agreement or between subse-
quent purchasers or assignees with notice. And the
covenants need not be of the kind which technically run
with the land. (Seward vs. Winters, 4 Sandf. Ch. 587..)
27
The complainant must be guilty of no delay in seek-
ing to restrain a breach of the covenants. (Same vs.
Same, 6 Ves., 104.) The amount of damages suffered
by the injured party is immaterial. In a note to Leech
vs. Schweder, L. R. 9 Oh., 463, Sir. G. Jessel, m. R.,
speaking of the injunction as a remedy for the breach
of restrictive covenants, says : "It is clearly establish-
ed by authority that there is sufficient grounds to jus-
tify the court interfering if there has been a breach
of the covenant. It is not for the court, but the plaiN
tiffs to estimate the amount of damages inflicted upon
them. The momet the court finds that there has been
a breach of covenant, that is an injury and the court
has no right to measure it, and no right to refuse to
the plaintiff the specific performance of his contract,
although his remedy is that which I have described.,'
There is another restrictive covenant, which equity
will enforce by means of an injunction, and that is where
one has agreed to refrain from engaging in any trade
within certain limits, as in Richardson vs. Peacock, 28
M. J. Eq., 151. The complainant, in this case, had
bought out the poultry business of the defendant, who
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agreed that he would not ship any poultry to the cities
of New York or Washington. A valuable consideration
was paid. The fixtures were worth but little, so
that nearly the whole amount was paid for this covenant.
Soon after this, the defendant began to buy and ship
poultry in violation of this agreement. During the
proceedings the defendant proved that he was acting as
the agent of other parties, but the court held that it
was such a violation of the spirit of the covenant as
to warrant an injunction. (Barret vs. Blagrave, 5 Ves.
555.) And where any negative agreement has been en-
tered into, as not to build on a certain lot, or not to
run a train past a certain station without stopping, the
court has interfered.
Often times where personal services, of a peculiar
value, are contracted for, as where a singer or actor
of note agrees to xkjgm perform at a certain place at
a specified time, and it is plain that an injured
party could have no remedy at law in a case of this kind,
because there is no criterion by which the damages can
be estimated. In cases of this kind, it is a well es-
tablished doctrine that a court of equity will not com-
pel affirmative specific performance, because the ser-
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vices are of such a nature that the court can not do so
by the ordinary processes of the court.
In England, however, although formerly the rule was
different, the courts hold that such contracts may be
enforced by negative methods. Thus, in Lumley vs.
Wagner, 1 De G., M. & G., 604, a prima donna had agreed
to sing three months in a certain place, and to sing no-
where else, she afterwards sought to repudiate the con-
tract. The court held that she could be restrained
from singing elsewhere. In the course of his opinion,
Lord St. Leonard said that, 'The agreement to sing for
the plaintiff during three months at his theatre and
during that time not to sing for anybody else, is not a
correlative contract ; it is, in effect, one contract
and though, beyond all doubt, this court could not in-
terfere to enforce the specific performance of the whole
of this contract, yet in all sound construction, and
according to the true spirit of the agreement, the en-
gagement to perform for three months must necessarily
exclude the right to perform at the same time at another
theatre.' And this doctrine has been affirmed and
further extended in Montague vs. Flockton, L. R., 16
Eq., 189.)
The American courts, as a rule, either entirely
reject the doctrine of Lumley vs. Wagner, or only par-
tially accept it. In Gallagher vs. Faye7te Co. R. R.
Co., 38 Pa. St., 102, a defendant who had contracted
with the complainant, to build a railroad depot upon his
grounds, ard had afterwards purchased other grounds for
that purpose, was not restrained from building on any
other lot, although the complainant brought suit for
this purpose.
